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Introduction 
 
The Australian economy has been transformed by bold federal government initiatives over the last 
decade.  The political rhetoric is that without these reforms, the Australian economy will falter and 
be uncompetitive in a global market place.  Despite the electoral disquiet that rapid systemic 
change brings, both sides of politics have adopted the broad starting point that it is imperative that 
our economy be transformed or Australian living standards will dramatically plummet.  
 
At the heart of these reforms is a reconstruction of the regulatory environment for government and 
business.  Some of the key areas of reform completed or in progress are: 
 
• Competition policy; 
• Financial sector reform; 
• Industrial relations reform; 
• Corporate law reform; 
• Telecommunications, media and electronic commerce; 
• Tax reform; and recently 
• Reform of the social welfare system. 
 
These broad market-based reforms when combined with "new public sector management" 
represent a major economic and social shift in public policy that can be examined from a number of 
perspectives.1 For this paper, I use the perspective of such reforms providing enhanced legal 
infrastructure for business and governments to conduct their transactions "cheaper, better and 
faster." Legal infrastructure is derived from a conception of the law in its broadest sense, the formal 
law on the statute books and the administrative law created by regulators in their attitudes and 
processes of interacting with the public.  These notions borrow from Roscoe Pound's "law in action" 
originating in the functionalist or American realist school of jurisprudence.2 Contemporary Australian 
scholarship of Roman Tomasic,3 I. Thynne and J. Goldring,4 R. Cranston5 and P. Grabosky and J. 
Braithwaite6 are examples of a contemporary "law in action" in the context of regulatory studies.  
 
My contention is that some legal infrastructure reform in Australia accompanying the major reform 
initiatives by the federal government has made both government agency regulation and the cost of 
doing business for participants in the market place "cheaper, better and faster".  Many of the legal 
infrastructure reforms have directly permitted business organisations to increase their productivity 
and financial health. 
 
In contrast, nonprofit organisations have not benefited to the same extent as business 
organisations from the regulatory reform.  If nonprofit organisations do actually play the significant 
economic role in the Australian economy that the Australian Nonprofit Data Project suggests, 
substantial benefits could accrue to the Australian economy through assisting nonprofit 
organisations to achieve their transactions "cheaper, better and faster".7 
 
1 C Hood, "A Public Management for All Seasons?", Public Administration ,Vol. 69 (1) , 1991, p 3-19. 
 
2  R. Pound, ‘The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence', Harvard Law Review, Vol.24, 1911, at pp.591-619; R. 
Pound, ‘Sociology of Law and Sociological Jurisprudence', University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol.5, 1934-35, pp.1-42; R. 
Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action', American Law Review, Vol.44, 1910, pp.12-31. 
3  For example, R. Tomasic, ‘Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in Australia: The Influence of Professional, 
Corporate and Bureaucratic Cultures', Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol.3, No.2, 1993 at pp.192-229. 
4  For example, I. Thynne & J. Goldring, Accountability and Control: Government Officials and the Exercise of Power, Law 
Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1987. 
5  For example, R. Cranston, Law, Government and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1987; R. Cranston, 
Legal Foundations of the Welfare State, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1985. 
6  For example, P. Grabosky & J. Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986. 
7 M Lyons, S Hocking, L Helms & Lester M Salamon,  "Australia", in Global Civil Society - Dimensions of the Nonprofit 
Sector, ed Lester M Salamon, Helmut K Anheier, Regina List, Stefan Toepler, S. Wojciech Sokolowski and Associates, 
The Johns Hopkins Centre for Civil Society Studies, Baltimore, MD, 1999. 
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The Australian government has not designated the nonprofit sector as a major part of the economy 
for reform, unlike some other governments.8 The Industry Commission Report on Charitable 
Organisations in the mid-nineties was released immediately before an election and has not led to a 
coherent and articulated policy by federal governments.9 The reasons for this lack of attention are 
a direct consequence of the government's sense of reform agenda priorities, that to date has not 
perceived the nonprofit sector as existing or being a part of the economy that could benefit from 
reform.  The formation of these priorities is a combination of the political agendas of the present 
coalition government and a lack of agitation by nonprofit interests and government agencies that 
deal with nonprofits.  Australia is unlike the US and UK where nonprofit peak organisations seek to 
represent the whole of the broad nonprofit sector and advocate for whole of sector recognition and 
policy initiatives.  Nonprofit peaks that advocate for social policy reforms or represent specific 
industry groupings within the sector such as disability or aged care characterize the Australian 
policy environment.10 Given such factors it is not surprising that the nonprofit sector as a whole has 
not been consider as a priority of the reform agenda. 
 
Firstly, the paper takes corporate law reform as a significant and sustained area of legal 
infrastructure reform over the last decade and examines how it has resulted in "cheaper better, 
faster" outcomes for regulators and the businesses.  Corporate law reform has been pursued by 
both sides of politics and provides an example of successful regulatory techniques accompanied 
by reducing compliance costs (those costs borne by regulated bodies), administrative costs (those 
borne by governments in administering the regulation) and transaction costs between parties in the 
market.  
 
Secondly, the paper examines the side effects of these broad reforms on the nonprofit sector using 
the corporate law to illustrate some of the adverse consequences for nonprofit organisations.  
Consideration is also given to the federal government's strategy to identify ineffective and 
inefficient regulation in policy development and the effective exclusion of nonprofit organisations 
from this process.  The consequence of a lack of understanding and positive concern for nonprofit 
organisations has resulted in side effects of business-orientated reforms that increase nonprofit 
compliance costs. 
 
Thirdly, the paper turns to illustrating the task of reform in facilitating legal infrastructure to permit 
access to "cheaper, better and faster" transactions, administration and compliance costs.  The 
three areas chosen illustrate different ways in which the reforms must tackle inappropriate laws 
and regulatory practices to produce a favourable regulatory environment for nonprofit 
organisations. 
 
 
Corporate Law Reform 
 
Corporate law reform is an illustration of the extent of "cheaper, better and faster" facilitation of 
transactions and re-regulation in the last decade.  Before the national reform of the Corporations 
Law in 1990, state regulatory agencies registered and regulated commercial companies.  There 
were considerable compliance costs and inefficiencies for Australian business under this 
arrangement.  The States treated their company office as little more than as a taxing agency with 
fee income having no relationship with the amount spent on administration.11 Grabosky and 
Braithwaite in a mid-eighties comparison of Australian regulatory agencies commented, "Corporate 
affairs regulation in Australia today is characterized by severe understaffing, massive backlogs, 
and political interference."12 The surviving public memories are the sagas of Bond and Skase and 
 
8 Home Office, Getting it Right Together. Compact on relations between Government and the Voluntary Sector in 
England, Cm 4100, London, 1998. 
9 Industry Commission, Charitable Organisations in Australia, Report No. 45, AGPS, Melbourne, 1995. 
 
10 J. May, “The Role of Peak Bodies in a Civil Society” in Keeping it Together – State and Civil Society in Australia, ed 
Adam Farrar and Jane Inglis, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1996. 
 
11 For example in Victoria some $13.6 million was taken in fees with $4.1 million being administrative costs, J Telfer, 
"The Policing of Companies - Including Some Comparisions of the Victorian and New South Wales Corporate Affairs 
Commission", Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol 1, 1983, p. 250. 
12 P Grabosky & J Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle - Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 10. 
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the "bottom of the harbour" tax scandal that could only occur in an environment of lax company 
office regulation.  However, it was more mundane issues that burdened the conduct of everday 
corporate business.  
 
For example: 
 
1. There were ineffectual accounting standards or enforcement of those standards to produce 
objective and comparable information for the market.  The independence of auditors and 
their compliance with standards through competitive tendering, audit opinion shopping, and 
forced the resignation of auditors who disagreed with management's proposed accounting 
treatments aggravated the situation.  
 
2. Lack of uniform laws required companies to register in each State and Territory of Australia 
when doing business nationally.  There was duplication of form filing, registration fees, as 
well as different forms and regulation in many states.  Even when the laws were similar 
through co-operative schemes, administrative discretion and practices differed between the 
state regulators. 
 
3. The administrative processes were very slow in all aspects of corporate regulation.  In 
Queensland, it would take up to three weeks to obtain the registration certificate of a 
company after filing the initial documents, a business name could take up to one or two 
months to merely reserve the name for later registration.  In New South Wales a special 
one day incorporation time was available at a substantial fee.  Registration of a prospectus 
would take at least three months of intensive negotiation with the regulator.  A search of 
corporate records through the micro fische system could take a day or more. 
 
Despite initial trenchant opposition from the States and at times business lobbies, the strong will of 
successive Federal Governments drove corporate law reform.  The States were successful in a 
High Court challenge to the initial attempt at a national corporate law regulatory scheme and 
settled out of court for over $102 million per annum with CPI indexation in perpetuity to 
compensate them for the foregone revenue through company filing fees.13 
 
Some of the "red tape reduction" achievements of the process have been: 
 
1. Legislation in the new succinct plain English style with one reforming Act making a 43% 
reduction in total words. 
 
2. Simplified procedures for registration of companies that is usually competed in a five to ten 
minute 'over the counter' operation from start to finish. 
 
3. Electronic filing of forms, real time Internet searching of a public data base of all company 
records and filing alert service.  It is among the top 100 Australian websites accessed in 
Australia. 
 
4. Reduction in proprietary company registers and paperwork compliance, particularly annual 
returns. 
 
5. A dramatic reduction of the time and expense for the filing of prospectus documents that 
seek to raise capital from the public from months to 66% of prospectuses being registered 
within five working days. 
 
There has also been a shift to "smarter regulatory techniques" accompanying this reduction in red 
tape and improvement of administrative procedures.  During the eighties, the National Companies 
and Securities Commission was not very successful in regulating or even influencing the market 
behavior of players in the corporate market place.  The Commission was under-funded with a 
 
13 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 8 ACLC 120; Future Corporate Regulation in Australia, known as the Alice 
Springs Agreement; R McQueen, "Business-Government Relations and Companies Regulation in Australia", in S Bell 
and J Wanna (eds), Business-Government Relations in Australia, Harcourt Brace Janovich, Sydney, 1992 at p 155. 
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budget less than the Industry Commission at the time or even the ACT school bus subsidy.14 In 
addition it embarked on long and expensive criminal trials against well-resourced companies and 
their officers.  It is extraordinarily difficult to prosecute white-collar crime for a number of reasons 
that need not be elaborated here, but as a strategy it was not working.  
 
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission has embraced using various forms of 
responsive or reflexive regulation combined with legal compliance standards.15 Some of the new 
regulatory strategies are: 
 
1. The Corporations Law allowed greater use of civil penalties that can be enforced either by 
aggrieved private individuals or the authorities.  This has permitted cheaper, quicker and 
more effective sanctioning of corporate behavior by both regulators and private parties. 
 
2. The Corporations Law has adopted fuzzy law that moves with industry and community 
expectations, rather than prescriptive checklists of requirements. 
 
3. Rationalisation of reporting and filing requirements permitting increased public access to 
records as well as almost total apprehension of filing defaults through the use of new 
computer technologies. 
 
4. Greater involvement with the parties in the market to gain intelligence, promote education 
and influence regulatory agendas of trade associations and professions without being the 
subject of inappropriate "capture".  Authorities are adopting prevention strategies, rather 
than reaction to a particular crisis. 
 
5. Adoption and promotion of legal compliance standard AS3806 to provide a regime of 
judicially recognised risk management of legal liabilities.  This has shifted administrative 
costs from regulators to market participants. 
 
6. Use of  "show" trials, publicity and innovative remedies to lever broad and long term 
compliance. 
 
By adopting similar strategies, the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission has 
changed the regulation of competition from a toothless tiger into a very effective regulatory 
agency.16 The ACCC together with the ASIC was responsible for the initiation of the Australian 
Legal compliance standard (AS3806) which is regarded as a world leader in compliance practice.  
This standard can be imposed as a judicial sanction on organisations and then independently 
audited to reform both the culture and internal structure of organisations at little cost to the 
regulator.17  
 
Another example of this new style of regulation is education and persuasion of all parties in the 
market place backed by some inexpensive, but very effective strategies.  Examples are the use by 
the ASIC of newspaper advertisements offering investors an investment share in blue bottle farms, 
air space over airports or Geeps (crossed bread sheep and goats).  When investors inquire, they 
are given consumer information about managed investments and their regulation.  On April fool's 
Day in 1999, the ASIC set up a fake Internet investment site called the Millennium Bug Insurance.  
Two hundred and thirty three people signed up to invest more than $4 million in a couple of days in 
a non-existent scheme without a prospectus or licence to manage investments.  In the following 
months, checks on registration of investment advisors doubled and visits to the consumer section 
increased by 70%.  In conjunction with consumer groups, they regularly evaluate financial advisors 
by posing as consumers and comparing the results.  All these strategies involve minimum 
expenditure, but produce impressive educative results and measurable impact in the market place. 
 
14  H Bosch, The Workings of a Watchdog, Heinmann, 1990, Melbourne, p. 41. 
 
15 Ayers & Braithwaite, ResponsiveRregulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, OUP, Oxford, 1992. 
16 B Fisse, "Corporate Compliance Programmes: The Trade Practices Act and Beyond", Australian Business Law 
Review, 1989 at p. 356. 
 
17 M. Welsh, "The Corporations Law civil penalty provisions and the lessons that can be learned from the Trade Practices 
Act 1974", Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 11, 2000, p. 298; ASIC, "Results from the 1999 Managed 
Investment National Surveillance Review", ASIC Media Release 00/156, 6 April, 2000. 
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By any measure, the corporate regulatory strategies and compliance are well advanced compared 
to its state at the end of the eighties.  Business, although it continually advocates cheaper 
compliance costs, is markedly better off in its transaction costs compared to the eighties.  
Regulators are getting a "bigger bang for their buck" while administrative costs are falling.  There 
are still regulatory issues and problems to overcome such as small consumer claims that the 
authorities will not enforce through legal action and the consumer cannot because of lack of 
funds.18 Most have more faith that these issues will be tackled and results improved over the next 
few years.19 
 
 
How do the reforms affect the Nonprofit Sector? 
 
Nonprofit organisations have been affected by the reform process along with the Australian 
community be it through lower prices, better quality products and services or reduction of services 
and phasing out of cross-subsidisation of provincial and rural sectors.  Reforms in the context of 
The New Tax System, corporate law reform, financial institution deregulation and competitive 
tendering by the public sector have particularly affected nonprofit organisations. 
 
However, the nonprofit sector as a whole, has not been a specifically identified part of the policy 
reform process to date in its own right.  Perhaps the nearest consideration was the Industry 
Commission Report on Charitable Organisations that had some of its recommendations 
implemented, but not in an overt policy program by either side of politics.20 Co-operatives have 
also been the subject of substantial legislative reform, with States and Territories agreeing to bring 
into place a core of similar legislation and administration that is reminiscent of the early company 
law reform attempts.  Nonprofit financial institutions such as building societies and credit unions 
have also undergone extensive legislative and administrative reforms.21  
 
The "cheaper, better, faster" outcomes that have been evident in for profit business have not 
necessarily flowed on to the nonprofit organisations.  In the re-regulation of other parts of the 
economy that touch on the nonprofit sector, the result is to increase compliance burdens and 
marginalise their legitimacy. 
 
An example is the corporate law reforms.  In terms of administration, it appears that companies 
limited by guarantee, the main form of nonprofit corporation, are not regarded as a major concern 
of the legislators or regulators.  The regulators have taken a number of small administrative 
measures that are unhelpful.  One example is replacing the standard reply letter with a model 
company limited by guarantee constitution for nonprofit organisations by one that refers inquirers to 
state based incorporated association regimes.  The ASIC region responsible for such companies in 
Hobart is remote from the major concentrations of nonprofit activity.  Thus, the ASIC give the 
impression of regarding nonprofit companies as not part of their core client focus.  
 
18 "The Watchdog no one fears", Business Review Weekly, 1 September, 2000, p58-64. 
 
19 Chant Link and Associates Pty Ltd,  Summary Report on Survey of Effectiveness, performance and reputation of the 
ASIC, ASIC, August, 2000. 
 
20 Ibid. 
 
21 DJ Hillier, A Hodgson & P Stevenson-Clarke, “Capital Adequacy Requirements, Credit Unions and Accounting 
Manipulations”, unpublished paper presented to the School of Accountancy Research Form, QUT, 12 October, 2000. 
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The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program has resulted in serious unintended consequences 
for companies limited by guarantee that are detailed in other works,22 but include: 
 
1. Abolition of a little used nonprofit form, a company limited by shares and guarantee; 
 
2. The widening of the definition of "company" to catch many non-company nonprofit 
organisations and bring them into the Corporations Law with its consequent obligations; 
 
3. The complication of name licences for companies and director's and officer's insurance of 
voluntary directors; 
 
4. The abolition of object clauses and constitutions that impacts upon required constitutional 
clauses by other legislation of nonprofit organisations; 
 
5. The application of insolvent trading liabilities of director's provisions to other nonprofit forms 
than Corporations Law companies; and 
 
6. Revision of public fundraising authorities for charitable organisations that has imposed 
compliance burdens upon them. 
 
A good indication of policy makers’ attitudes to the nonprofit sector is illustrated by the guidelines 
for ensuring effective and efficient process of federal laws and regulations.  In 1997, the federal 
government adopted a process for laws and regulations to be accompanied by a Regulation 
Impact Statement (RIS).  The RIS is a statement prepared by a department responsible for the 
proposed regulatory reform.  Following consultation with affected parties, a document is prepared 
that sets out a cost benefit analysis of the policy and a range of other options to achieve the same 
objectives.  The RIS is included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill presented to 
Parliament.  One may have expected the interests of nonprofit organisations in these reforms to be 
considered.  However, the definition of "business" employed in the guidelines excludes partly 
nonprofit organisations in that, 
 
"'Business' includes any private organisation which aims to make a profit, the 
commercial activities/transactions of not-for-profit organisations, and any government 
business enterprise."23 
 
Distinguishing what is a commercial transaction rather than a “transaction” of a nonprofit 
organisation is difficult and not defined.  Nonprofit organisations encountered difficulties with such 
concepts of commercial transactions with The New Tax System that are still to be fully resolved.24 
The non-inclusion of a nonprofit organisation has seriously affected the application of the possible 
benefits of reform for such organisations. 
 
The Australian Taxation Office has also produced its own specialised guidelines for the preparation 
of their RIS that again adopts the 'business' only restriction on impacts.25 However, there are 
attempts to include the impacts on nonprofit organisations, but they are often ill informed and 
cannot be as rigorous as business impacts because of the lack of economic data and models for 
the nonprofit sector.  For example, the estimates used for charity and deductible gift recipient 
endorsements (200,000 entities) appear to be wide of the mark and the costs for the recent 
 
22 M.McGregor-Lowndes & K. Levy, "Name Licences: the Company Name you have when you are not having a 
Commercial Name," Current Commercial Law, Vol 4 , 1996, p 12; S Woodward, "Non-profit Companies - Some 
Implications of Recent Corporate Law Reforms," Company and Securities Law Journal, vol 17 1999, p. 390; 
M.McGregor-Lowndes, "An Examination of Recent Taxation Amendments, Corporate Law Reforms and Queensland 
Legislative Reforms affecting Nonprofit Organisations," Working Paper No. 77, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, 
1998; C. Huntley, "Dionysius, Damocles and the Unseen Perils of Insolvency for Officers of Incorporated Associations", 
Companies and Securities Law Journal, Vol. 18 (4), p 262; B. Cox, "Corporations Law Fundraising Provisions for 
Nonprofit Organisations - Are they Caught?", Working paper No. 55, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, QUT, 1994. 
 
23 Office of Regulation Review, A Guide to Regulation,  2nd edition, December, 1998, p. B3. 
 
24 ATO, Charities Consultative Committee Resolves Issues and  Answers, 1 July, 2000 http://www.taxreform.ato.gov.au. 
 
25 ATO, ATO Guidelines for the preparation of Regulation Impact Statements (RIS), September 1998. 
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philanthropic tax initiatives were based on a behavioural response of 15% that may or may not 
have any basis.26 The most significant RIS is the RIS for the introduction of a Goods and Service 
Tax where discussion of the impact on charities was cut short with the statement that,  
 
"Because of the diversity of their activities these bodies are not separately identified in 
the following analysis.  However, an indication on these bodies can be inferred from the 
analysis of the impact on governments and business."27 
 
There would be few who would suggest that the government's estimate of gross compliance costs 
per business firm of $1195 and the net compliance cost of $130 per business firm would be 
anywhere similar for a nonprofit organisation that was exempt from indirect tax prior to the GST, 
even before the amendment of the legislation to accommodate the Australian Democrats.28 
 
If nonprofit organisations do actually play the significant economic role in the Australian economy 
that the Australian Nonprofit Data Project suggests, substantial benefits could accrue to the 
Australian economy through assisting nonprofit organisations to achieve their transactions 
"cheaper, better and faster".29  There is evidence presented in the next part of this paper that much 
of the legal facilitation of nonprofit transactions is less than efficient or effective, being very 
reminiscent of the state of corporate regulation in the eighties or worse. 
 
 
Areas of Reform for Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure for Nonprofit Organisations 
 
Considerable scope exists for improving the legal and regulatory infrastructure for nonprofit 
organisations and their regulators to achieve "cheaper, better and faster" transactions, 
administration and compliance costs.  There has been little broad-based, multi-jurisdictional 
facilitative reform attempted in Australia since the introduction of the incorporated association 
statutes in the early eighties by individual states and the more recent adoption of core legislative 
framework for co-operatives by each state and territory.  
 
Any reform agenda would have to be led by a federal government with considerable political will to 
drive through reforms that would involve the co-operation of the states and territories.  A similar 
resolve to that required to achieve the national corporations regimes would be needed over a 
sustained period.  The task of politically managing such a process of reform at present seems 
difficult given the lack of a peak association for the whole of the sector or a broad coalition of peak 
bodies that any government could interact with concerning the reform process.  Another essential 
element of the recent reform agendas of both corporations and taxation reform has been a broad 
community agreement that both areas were "broken and needed fixing".  Whether the public 
perception of a nonprofit regulatory environment in need of reform is present or could be evoked is 
also not clear.  Many powerful and vocal nonprofit organisations would actively oppose the creation 
of such a perception because it would directly impact upon their trustworthiness in the community 
and hence their access to donations, sponsorship and volunteers. 
 
The issue of the creation of a national regulatory body such as the English Charity Commission or 
a lead agency regulator such as the US Internal Revenue Service is another crucial policy 
decision.  As the Industry Commission noted, the creation of a specialist regulator has many 
advantages, but it was not convinced that the advantages could not be achieved through other 
means.30 It opted for the Australian Securities Commission, as it then was, to be a lead regulator 
through forcing all nonprofit organisations to register as special companies under its jurisdiction.31 
An alternative would be the Australian Taxation Office that has the ability to influence the conduct 
 
26 Department of Treasury, Response to Senate Economics Committee Questions, 17 November 1999. 
27 Australia, Regulation Impact Statement for the Introduction of a Goods and Services Tax, 2 December, 1998, p.4 
 
28 Ibid, p 6. 
 
29 M Lyons, S Hocking, L Helms & Lester M Salamon,  "Australia", in Global Civil Society - Dimensions of the Nonprofit 
Sector, ed Lester M Salamon, Helmut K Anheier, Regina List, Stefan Toepler, S. Wojciech Sokolowski and Associates, 
The Johns Hopkins Centre for Civil Society Studies, Baltimore, MD, 1999. 
 
30 Industry Commission, op cit, p 210. 
 
31 Ibid, p. 217. 
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and regulation of all substantial nonprofit organisations in Australia.  Unless some type of lead 
agency is created and resourced, it will be difficult to provide the benefits of a consistant national 
administrative regime for nonprofit organisations. 
 
An important issue for the construction of such regulatory and legal facilitation reform is to 
understand the nature of nonprofit organisations and clearly identify the crucial attributes that will 
influence the success or failure of the broad reforms.  Not all the strategies used for profit 
organisations will be appropriate to apply to nonprofit organisations.  Attention has to be paid to the 
often "invisible" functions that nonprofit organisations perform.32 There are dangers in too readily 
adopting policy solutions from other jurisdictions that fail to take account of the different legal, 
social and policy framework in Australia and strategies from for profit regulation that are 
inappropriate for nonprofit regulation.33 
 
Some of the major parts of any reform agenda to provide legal and regulatory facilitation for 
nonprofit organisations may be: 
 
1. An appropriate set of accounting and/or auditing standards for nonprofit entities. 
 
2. Reform of the basic law and regulation of nonprofit transactions such as gifts, sponsorships 
and volunteering. 
 
3. Reform of the legal vehicles to carry on nonprofit activities such as companies limited by 
guarantee, trusts, incorporated associations, unincorporated associations, mutual 
organisations and the unique private statute and royal charter organisations.  The 
establishment of a national scheme or common core legislation is long overdue. 
 
4. Reform of the taxation laws, in particular the defining characteristics of organisations that 
are awarded status that involves tax expenditures. 
 
5. Reform of fundraising and collection laws. 
 
6. Reform of the re-deployment of lazy nonprofit assets. 
 
7. Reform of the regulatory practices of agencies to ensure that they are focused on matters 
of critical importance faciltating a healthy and vibrant nonprofit sector with appropriate 
balance of administrative costs to themselves and compliance cost of nonprofit 
organisations. 
 
To outline the details of such a reform agenda is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, there 
are three issues that will be dealt with in the following part of this paper to illustrate the nature, type 
and need for such a reform agenda.  
 
The first part takes some very basic laws that apply to a transaction at the very heart of most 
nonprofit organisations, that of the "gift".  This part illustrates the fundamental law reform that is 
necessary to facilitate the basic transactions of nonprofit entities that have not been the subject of 
extensive legislative scrutiny because they are not "business" transactions.  If a "gift" were an 
important transaction for a business organisation, the law would have been reformed to facilitate 
the transaction by making it beyond ambiguity with commonly accepted terms that reduced 
transaction costs and ambiguities. 
 
The second part examines fundraising legislation that is an example of mostly derelict state 
regulation with little uniformity that has lost relevance and focus.  It is an area of high compliance 
costs for nonprofit organisations, if they comply. 
 
 
32 Nonprofit organisations perform important functions that are not traditionally economically measured such as the 
creation of social capital, trust and voluntarism. 
 
33 M. McGregor-Lowndes, "Nonprofit Corporations - Reflections on Australia's Largest Nonprofit Insolvency", Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1995, pp 417-441. 
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In the third part I raise an issue that has the potential to be a substantial economic and social issue 
for the Australian community.  A number of pressures are growing to force the re-deployment of 
substantial nonprofit assets to the for-profit sector.  Health assets such as hospitals, hostels, 
nursing homes and domiciliary care are prime candidates and the proceeds of such conversions 
need to be captured and then redeployed into socially useful purposes. 
 
 
Facilitating Gifts to Nonprofit Organisations 
 
Many of the internal and external transactions in which nonprofit organisations engage, particularly 
those that are uncommon or not valued in the for profit sector, have relatively underdeveloped 
jurisprudence that has not kept pace with contemporary requirements.  There are many reasons 
contributing to such transactions not being progressively re-fashioned to serve the interests of 
nonprofit organisations or society generally.  Often, the courts have regarded such transactions as 
social, domestic or trivial affairs and followed a policy of non-intervention.  Legislators have not 
turned their mind to such matters.34 Times have changed and, because such transactions are 
important both to the parties, the economy and Australian society, they deserve to be facilitated 
and regulated by the law.  An example of one such neglected transaction is that of the gift. 
 
One may have the expectation that Australian law would facilitate gifts of money and property to 
nonprofit organisations.  After all, Australians have been engaged in such transactions for many 
years.  It is at one level a simple transaction.  Someone gives some property to a nonprofit 
organisation without material benefit in return.  There are a number of outstanding legal issues in 
need of reform or clarification with respect to gifts.  These have been recently highlighted by the 
Australian Taxation Office's interpretation of what is a gift for GST purposes.35 A draft ruling that 
touched on the matter was substantially revised and re-issued as a final ruling leaving a remaining 
degree of disquiet in both the legal profession and the nonprofit sector.36 One prominent GST 
commentator has described the law about the definition of a gift as an "ancient and undefined 
concept" to which the courts have added little clarity to date.37 In the principal High Court judgment 
on gifts, the court noted, 
 
"The word "gift" … is a monosyllabic old English noun of norse derivation which 
designates a descriptive category of transfer of property.  Once it is accepted that it is 
to be given meaning which bears a matter of ordinary language, it is not to be assumed 
that its ambit can be properly defined, with a lawyer's or logician's precision, by 
reference to a number of unqualified propositions or tests or by identification with 
different polysyllabic words whose etymological origins provide greater scope for 
reasoning as to precise meaning…"38 
 
While it is not unusual for lawyers to disagree over the meaning of the word, the interesting issue 
with the gifts and GST debate was that the perception and accepted meaning of a "gift" among 
those in the sector and the general community differed markedly from that of the income tax law 
and practice of the ATO.  A further ruling on gifts from the ATO is being prepared.  The matter is 
still not beyond doubt and we await the court's determination of contested matters. 
 
English and Australian law will not generally enforce a promise to make a gift or to complete a 
partial gift.39 This leaves nonprofit organisations trying to make binding and certain arrangements 
where a gift is promised in stages or where a gift is conditional upon matching or other conditions.  
 
34 M.McGreor-Lowndes, "Gifts, the Law and functional rationalism", Program on Nonprofit Corporations, Working Paper 
No. 17, Queensland University of Technology, 1992. 
 
35 ATO, Charities Consultative Committee Resolves Issues and  Answers, 1 July, 2000 http://www.taxreform.ato.gov.au. 
 
36 ATO Ruling GST 2000/11 - Grants of Financial Assistance. 
 
37 P. Hill, "Gifts and GST",  GST Today 19 June, 2000, at p.10-14. 
 
38 Leary v FCT (1980) 11 ATR 146. 
 
39M.McGreor-Lowndes, "Gifts, the Law and Functional Rationalism", Program on Nonprofit Corporations,  Working Paper 
No. 17, Queensland University of Technology, 1992. 
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It stands in stark contrast to the attitude developed in the American jurisdiction that also had 
English jurisprudence as its base.  
 
American law has a long tradition of favouring, on a public policy stance, such gift transfers which 
would have traditionally failed because of a lack of consideration required by English courts.40 Justice 
Harris in Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company41 after noting the difficulty of enforcing 
gift transfers said: 
 
 "Yet, the courts have generally striven to find grounds for enforcement, indicating the 
depth of feeling in this country that private philanthropy serves a highly important function 
in our society." 
 
Professor Shattuck commented as early as 1937 that, 
 
 "No more interesting instance of judicial legislation is to be found in the books.  Our courts 
have taken it upon themselves to make certain that no subscriber to charity escapes 
paying his subscription."42 
 
This desire has driven judges to find consideration on various tenuous grounds.  Transfers have been 
enforced on the basis that the donee promises to use the property for charitable purposes.43 Cohen 
points out that the nonprofit organisation is bound by the objects of its constitution and the 
nondistribution constraint to do so in any case, so there is no real promise made.44 In other cases, the 
argument has been that other donors have contributed in reliance on the promise by the particular 
donor and the mutual promise affords good consideration.45 A moral obligation has been found to be 
consideration for the enforcement of a gift transfer46 and the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel 
is also used.  If the donee has in reliance on the promise altered their position such as expending 
money, incurring a liability, performing services, then consideration will exist.47 It has been criticised in 
the following terms: 
 
 "Courts should act with restraint in respect to the public policy arguments endeavouring to 
sustain a mere charitable subscription.  To ascribe consideration where there is none, or 
to adopt any other theory which affords charities a different legal rationale than other 
entities, is to approve fiction. 
 
 The wisdom of such a policy, its possible detriment as well as its benefit to public bodies, 
may be the subject of legislative inquiry and decision."48 
 
40 A.L. Corbin, ‘Corbin on Contracts, A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law', Section 118 (West 
ed. 1965); Kenneth P. Cohen, ‘Charitable Subscriptions - Is consideration necessary?', Baylor Law Review, Vol.26, 1974, 
pp.256-261. 
41 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974). 
42 W.L. Shattuck, ‘Gratuitous promises - a new writ?', Michigan Law Review, Vol.35, 1937, pp.908-945 at 931. 
43 In re Lord's Will 175 Misc. 921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747, 151 A.L.R. 589. 
44 Kenneth P. Cohen, ‘Charitable Subscriptions - Is consideration necessary?', Baylor Law Review, Vol.26, 1974, pp.256-
261, at p. 256-7. 
45 Such authorities are summarised in the case of G.B. Jordan et al., v. Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami Inc., a Florida 
corporation not for profit 276 So.2d 102 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
46 Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. 416 (1846). 
47 Some case examples are Doyle v. Glassock, 24 Tex. 200, 58 S.W. 152 (1859) and McKeon v. City of Council Bluffs, 206 
Iowa 556, 221 N.W. 351, 62 A.L.R. 1006. 
48 Jordan v. Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami Inc., op. cit. at 108. 
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A bold step is contained in the Second Restatement of Contracts in which enforcement of charitable 
subscriptions can be achieved without consideration or detrimental reliance.49 A promise which the 
donor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the donee will be 
enforced if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  Unlike other types of 
promises, the court does not have to inquire whether the promise actually induced action or 
forbearance on the part of the donee.  This allows the allegation of reliance by the donee to be 
enforced by the court without investigation and avoids the problem of mixed motives. 
 
Novack discusses many organisations that are seeking to enforce promises of property to nonprofit 
organisations in the American courts.50 American judicial decisions and statutes have facilitated the 
enforcement of gift property transfers.  This could be directly attributed to the greater flexibility of the 
American judiciary to accommodate perceived public policy and the historical importance accorded to 
philanthropic activity.  It is a stark contrast to the English and Australian legal relationship between 
donors and donees. 
 
Another interesting facilitation of gifts issue has arisen in two reports published recently.  A recent 
report commissioned by the Prime Minister's Community Business Partnership Program explores 
the current attitudes and motives for corporate philanthropy of over 100 large Australian 
corporations.51  It found that:  
 
"10 percent of companies studied embrace community involvement activities as an 
obligation to 'put back into the community' in which they do business, without looking 
for a commercial return or business benefit.  Indeed, some strongly resist the idea that 
they might be seeking a return to the business."52 
 
It also notes the size and extent of American corporations that contribute billions each year.  
However, the report fails to recognize that this has not always been so in the United States until 
the State of Texas amended to its law to specifically permit corporations to make charitable gifts, 
departing from the English common law in 1917.53 In the 1950s, two landmark US common law 
cases overturned the disability of companies to make corporate gifts.54 There are now three 
distinct types of charitable giving provisions in the state codes 
 
(1) "twenty-four states and the District of Columbia where corporations have the 
power to make donations,  
 
(2) nineteen other states authorises contributions that "further the business affairs of 
the corporation", and  
 
49 The Second Restatement of Contracts  Chapter 4 P90(2) takes the position that 
 (1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the 
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.... 
 (2) A charitable subscription .... is binding under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or 
forbearance. 
50 Janet Novack, Forbes, 29 October, 1990, p.68. One case she mentions was before the courts seeking $12 million on 
behalf of nine charities from one estate as the result of unfulfilled pledges. The American broadsheet The Chronicle of 
Philanthropy while profiling presidential candidate Ross Perot's philanthropy mentioned several threats of legal action 
concerning Perot gifts. (The Chronicle of Philanthropy, June 16, 1992 pp.7-11.) 
51 Centre for Corporate Public Affairs & Business Council of Australia, Corporate Community Involvement - Establishing 
a Business Case, Melbourne, 2000. 
 
52 Ibid, at p. 11 and further on p. 41. 
 
53 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. ANN. Art 1349 (West 1917). 
 
54 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v Trustees, Inc, 329 P. 2d 398 (Utah 
1958). 
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(3) seven other states have enacted laws authorizing corporations to make 
charitable contributions "irrespective of corporate benefit".55 
 
The law of corporations in both England and Australia does not facilitate corporations making pure 
philanthropic gifts.  A director or senior executive risks breaching his or her duty to act in good faith 
in the interests of the company if he or she authorizes a donation in circumstances where there is 
no obvious benefit - direct or indirect - for the company's shareholders.56 This is not something that 
has lacked legal attention in Australia, a chapter being devoted to it in Legal Issues for Non-Profit 
Associations.  The recent report by the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation at the 
University of Melbourne also considered the issue.57 That Centre’s report was prompted by a 
suggestion by the Australian Democrats that all political contributions by listed public companies be 
subject to enhanced regulation, public disclosure and approval by shareholders. 
 
If the government is serious about encouraging philanthropy, then it should ensure a legislative 
amendment to put corporate pure philanthropy on a proper footing.  It also stands as a warning 
against copying the policy practices from a foreign jurisdiction without understanding the legal 
context from which it originates. 
 
 
Fundraising 
 
The solicitation of funds from the public has been a traditional source of revenue for nonprofit 
organisation in Australia and there is growing emphasis on the activity within organisations.  This is 
evidenced by the growing number of professional fundraisers either employed in or contracted to 
nonprofit organisations as well as the current federal government's encouragement of philanthropy 
through Community Business Partnerships.  Clearly the federal government and nonprofit 
organisations have the expectation that fundraising from the public is an area of revenue 
expansion.  There are new technologies available to fundraisers such as E-mail, Internet and 
satellite broadcasting that are assisting domestic as well as external nonprofit organisations 
seeking to raise funds from the Australian public.  Are the regulatory regimes that presently apply 
to such activities adequate and do they provide the necessary infrastructure for such activities? 
 
All Australian States and Territories have some form of special charitable fundraising legislation 
except for Tasmania and the Northern Territory.  The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission has 
recommended special legislation, but this has not been acted upon.58 Victoria in 1998 and New 
South Wales in 1991 have reviewed their fundraising legislation while the other jurisdictions have 
only made minor changes to their statutes and regulations.  The legislation's date of origin in South 
Australia is 1939, Western Australia 1946, ACT 1959 and Queensland 1966 and draws much from 
an attitude of regulating the excesses of fundraising dealing with patriotic funds during the first and 
second world wars.  
 
Dal Pont argues that the "antiquity of the legislation in some jurisdictions" and the lack of uniformity 
demand wholesale reform.59 An example of this antiquity is the cloning of parts of the English 
Metropolitan Streets Act 1903 that included provisions such as that which to this day appears in 
the Western Australian legislation and until 1999 in the Queensland legislation.  The provision is 
that "No collector shall use a box or other receptacle at the end of a pole intended to reach upper 
windows or the roofs of conveyances." This related to London stagecoaches and terrace houses 
 
55 F S Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the problem of Corporate Philanthropy, UCLA Law Review, Vol 
44 (3), 1997, p 579 at p 603. 
56 Hutton (1883) 23 Ch D 654. 
 
57 S Fisher, "Corporations as Donors: A Legal Survey", in Legal Issues for Non-profit Associations, ed McGregor-
Lowndes, Fletcher & Sievers, LBC, Sydney, 1996; I Ramsay, G Stapledon, J Vernon, "Political Donations by Australian 
Companies, Centre for Law and Securities Regulation", The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 2000. 
 
58 Law Reform Commission of Tasmania, Report on Public Fundraising by Charitable Institutions, Government Printer, 
Tasmania, 1996, Report No. 75. 
 
59 G Dal Pont, Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000, p388. 
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that are now uncommon in both Brisbane and Perth.60 In the age of Internet solicitation, such 
quaint regulations of a century ago serve to illustrate the gap between the present regulation and 
regulation that facilitates fundraising in the new economy. 
 
While there is little uniformity in the provisions or what type of nonprofit organisation or fundraising 
activity the laws apply to, the broad thrust of the regulation is to protect the public against 
misleading and deceptive appeals, misappropriation of funds and prevention of unacceptable 
fundraising practices such as nuisances to the public.  This is achieved through registration of 
those permitted to conduct fundraising activity, prescription of fundraising behaviours, monitoring of 
annual financial reports and disclosure of information to the public.  However, there is evidence to 
suggest that the style of current legislative regulation and its implementation are ineffectual. 
 
Several studies have examined the annual financial report filing default rate of fundraising 
organisations under fundraising regulation.  Two studies of the Victorian register of charities under 
The Hospitals and Charities Act have measured default rates.  The first study in 1978 found that 
49.9 percent of charities that were not subsidised by government funds defaulted in lodging annual 
returns and 45.7 percent of those charities that received government subsidies had defaulted.61  
Five years later, when the study was repeated on the same register of charities, it was found that 
44.6 percent of charities were in default.62  The default rate of Queensland charities under the 
Collections Act in 1989 was 38% and in 1992 was 31%.63 It is probable that such rates of default 
still exist in some states and do not match the standards set by corporate regulators in business 
names registries or the ASIC.  The annual reports to Parliament of such Departments never 
publish register default rates.  Many regulators do not know what the default actually is at any time.  
Registers are only now being computerised in some states and there is no electronic filing of 
returns.  
 
In comparison, the ASIC company filing default rate was 18% in 1988 and reduced to 7% in 1999 
despite time for filing such returns reducing.64 There is room for a great deal of improvement in 
maintaining a public register of fundraising organisation's financial returns.  
 
All jurisdiction's legislative provisions require serious consideration as to their regulatory strategies, 
even New South Wales and Victoria that have had substantial policy revisions.  Although an 
improvement on previous provisions, there is still considerable room for reform and tackling some 
of the difficult issues such as the use of new technologies, mutual recognition between jurisdictions 
and reduced compliance and administration costs. 
 
The Industry Commission in 1995 described fundraising legislation as largely outdated, badly in 
need of reform, exhibiting major inconsistencies involving significant compliance and administrative 
costs.65 It criticized the lack of uniformity of the legislation, particularly the definitions of bodies or 
activities that were regulated, the administrative and compliance costs, regulating new fundraising 
technologies as well as fundraising issues with respect to public nuisance and privacy.  It 
recommended that there be uniformity of legislation, mutual recognition of the legislation and 
measures to reduce compliance costs and duplication of information.  As pointed out earlier in this 
paper, the reforms to business legislation have been proceeding rapidly along these lines to 
reduce both administrative costs for governments and compliance costs for businesses. 
 
 
60 P. Luxton, Charity Fund-Raising and the Public Interest - An Anglo-American Perspective, Avebury, Aldershot, 1990 at 
p. 28; M Chesterman, 'Regulation of Charities: Here and Abroad', in Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming 
the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes, Comparative Public Policy Research Unit Monash University and Australian 
Tax Research Foundation, Melbourne, 1991, p82. 
61Williams and Warfe, The Charities Sector in Victoria - Characteristics and Public Accountability, Accounting and 
Finance,  May 1982, at pp. 59-61. 
62McGillivray, Romano, Williams, Regulating the Accountability of Charitable Associations: The Victorian Experience, 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 44, 1987, pp. 307-317. 
63 McGregor-Lowndes, M, C McDonald & D Dwyer,"Public Fundraising in Queensland", Program on Nonprofit 
Corporations Working Paper No. 14, Brisbane, 1993, p 18. 
 
64 Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Annual Report 1998-1999, http://www.asic.gov.au. 
 
65 Industry Commission,  Charitable Organisations In Australia, Report No. 45, AGPS, Canberra, 16 June, 1995, p.234. 
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Before 1999, it was a feat of legal contortion to organize the registration of an organisation under 
each of the state fundraising statutory provisions because of conflicting requirements, particularly 
for constitutions.  Registration procedures have become a little simpler since amendments to 
Victorian and Queensland legislation.  The duplication and red tape involved in complying with 
different laws in each jurisdiction still remain with different reporting and accounting requirements 
in each State and Territory.  One organisation reported to the Industry Commission that their 
fundraising compliance was about $1 million a year.66 This is an area of reform that could bring 
immediate tangible benefits to nonprofit organisations. 
 
Some States make it difficult for funds raised in the State to be used outside that State either by 
direct legislative direction or inclusion of restrictions in licenses or sanctions.67 This also makes 
national and international campaigns difficult.  When combined with the income tax requirements 
for exemption and donation deductibility, significant barriers are placed in the path of nonprofit 
organisations. 
 
An overdue reform has been the reform of the investment powers of organisations registered under 
Collections Acts.  The traditional form of regulation was to prescribe a list of sanctioned 
investments that were conservative, low interest and capital growth gilt-edged securities.  This was 
achieved through the Trusts Act in each jurisdiction.68 The policy thrust was to preserve trust 
property by a conservative investment strategy.  Under the new approach known as 'the prudent 
person rule', the trustee may invest in any investment, subject to the terms of the trust and 
tempered by a duty of care that requires a positive duty to consider the purposes and needs of the 
trust, risk, growing the capital base of the trust and the application of financial portfolio theory.  
However, it is not without its problems in implementation by trustees because of concerns such as 
ethical investment, other non-financial considerations, the interests of third parties and once again 
lack of consistent legislative provisions.69 An interesting quirk is a drafting oversight in the linking 
provisions between the Queensland Collections Act and the Queensland Trusts Act.  The 
Collections Act Regulations direct a registered charity or association may only invest its assets in a 
way mentioned in section 21 of the Trusts Act.  Section 21 of the Trusts Act states: 
 
"A trustee may, unless expressly forbidden by the instrument creating the trust - 
(a) invest trust funds in any form of investment; and 
(b) at any time, vary an investment or realize an investment of trust funds and 
reinvest an amount resulting from the realization in any form of investment." 
 
One interpretation of the provisions would have registered Collections Act organisations being able 
to freely invest without the tempering prudent investor provisions.  It is the following sections that 
impose the prudent investor code upon a trustee with respect to their investment, but the 
Collections Regulations do not import those provisions.  It is a matter that needs urgent attention 
and should never have arisen. 
 
There is a significant issue with respect to who or what is being regulated.  Most jurisdictions 
combine a class of organisation with a specified activity.  For example, the provisions may identify 
charitable organisations conducting appeals to the public.  There is a strong argument that it 
makes little difference whether the collection is by a charitable or non-charitable organisation, if the 
primary motive is to seek to protect the donor.70 Since each jurisdiction has a different definition of 
both organisations caught and what constitutes a public appeal that is subject to regulation, this 
compounds compliance costs.  For example, in Victoria provisions applying to particular 
fundraising appeals do not apply to state schools, universities, TAFE colleges, registered funded 
 
66 Industry Commission,  Charitable Organisations In Australia, Report No. 45, AGPS, Canberra, 16 June, 1995, p233. 
 
67 For example, ACT Collections Act 1959 section 5 and the usual sanction provisions issued by Queensland regulators. 
 
68 Trustee Act 1936 (SA); Trustee Act 1958(Vic); Trustees Act 1962 (WA); Trustee Act 1925 (NSW); Trustee Act 1898 
(Tas); Trustee Act 1893 (NT); Trusts Act 1973 (QLD). 
 
69 GE Dal Pont, "Conflicting Signals for the Trustees' Duty to Invest", Australian Business Law Review, Vol. 24, 1996, p 
140; P McDermott, "Trustee Investment Law Reform", Australian Law Journal, Vol. 70, 1996, p 801. 
 
70 M Chesterman, 'Regulation of Charities: Here and Abroad', in Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the 
Tax Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes, Comparative Public Policy Research Unit Monash University and Australian Tax 
Research Foundation, Melbourne, 1991, p88. 
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health agencies, religious organisations, political parties, trade unions, employer associations and, 
by special regulation, The Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria.  It is a noticeable feature of fundraising 
legislation that religious organisations and often their social welfare bodies as well as government 
bodies are exempt from all or part of the regulation.  Government bodies have over the last decade 
become increasingly involved in raising funds from the public for their activities such as state 
schools, hospitals and health establishments and emergency and rescue organisations.  
 
In New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, there are substantial complete exemptions or 
relaxations for religious organisations.  The Survey on Giving conducted for the Australian 
Nonprofit Data Project in 1997 indicates that 36.8% ($1025 million) of donations to nonprofit 
organisations in Australia went to religious organisations.71 Because it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for the donating public to recognise religious charities as they seek to refashion their public 
image to exclude any reference to their sponsoring religious entity, it is possible that this figure 
could be considerably higher.  In the three eastern States, probably one third of fundraising 
appears to be partially or completely exempted from regulation. 
 
A public policy rationale for such exemption is commonly based on the reputation for ethical and 
appropriate practices within such organisations.  It could be argued that it does give religious 
organisations and their community service organisations a distinct competitive advantage in the 
raising of funds from the public.  There are substantial compliance costs with complying with the 
various legislative regimes that exponentially increase when you are operating across state 
borders. 
 
The fundraising regulation does not readily apply to the present or future challenges facing 
fundraising through the new technologies of the Internet, Email or satellite broadcasting.  Whereas 
already the fundraising pitch is being made inside the offices and homes of Australians through 
their computers by persons and organisations that may never be physically present in any form in 
Australia, the fundraising statutes are expressed in terms of regulating behaviour on the streets 
and front doors of Australia.  
 
In many jurisdictions there are attempts to regulate the collection of goods or sale of goods by 
commercial organisations using the endorsement of nonprofit organisations.  The jurisdictions vary 
widely in their definition of such activity and the regulation of such conduct.  It can include the sale 
of pins and badges, second hand goods collection, endorsement and sponsorship arrangements.  
Where older legislative provisions are written in terms of representing that part of the proceeds of 
races, fetes and bazaars are to be donated to nonprofit organisations, newer provisions are 
couched in terms of appeals conducted jointly with traders or donated clothing bins.  Some 
provisions require agreements to be entered into between the parties with specified provisions, 
subject to the approval of the jurisdiction's administering body.  Practitioners report that approval of 
some agreements is difficult and made even more time consuming when national agreements 
require approval of several different regulators with different legislative requirements. 
 
This style of regulation that specifically mandates contents of documents has in other areas been 
abandoned for regulatory schemes that require the parties to establish their fairness and probity.  
 
Another area of concern is the rise of cause related marketing in Australia.  This activity is growing 
rapidly following its perceived success in America during the early 1990s.  One of the earliest 
successful examples occurred in 1983 when American Express advertised that for every purchase 
made with their card, they would donate one penny to the renovation of the Statute of Liberty.  
Nearly $1.7 million was raised in a short period.  In 1998, it was estimated that corporate 
sponsorship in America would be $6.8 billion, with about $535 million paid for the use of a 
nonprofit's name and logo in advertising.72 Clearly Australia is heading down this path urged on by 
the success of some Australian cause related marketing schemes and the Prime Minister's 
Business Community Partnerships.  
 
71 M Lyons, S Hocking, L Helms & Lester M Salamon,  "Australia", in Global Civil Society - Dimensions of the Nonprofit 
Sector, ed Lester M Salamon, Helmut K Anheier, Regina List, Stefan Toepler, S. Wojciech Sokolowski and Associates, 
The Johns Hopkins Centre for Civil Society Studies, Baltimore, MD, 1999. 
 
72 Office of the New York State Attorney General, What's in a Nonprofit's Name, April, 1999, p 6, 
http://oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/nonprofit/executive_summary.html. 
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In America, litigation involving cause related marketing is becoming such a concern that the 
Attorneys General of nineteen states and the District of Columbia have issued a report on the 
problems for nonprofit organisations.73 A series of court cases against businesses and nonprofits 
that contract for exclusive use of the nonprofit's name, logo and endorsement of the business' 
products where the claims made are deceptive, false or misleading.  The report lists damages paid 
by prominent nonprofits such as The Arthritis Foundation ($2 million), the American Medical 
Association ($9.9 million) and a string of injunctive cases involving nonprofit organisations.  It 
appears as the number of caused related products in the market increases, consumer impact falls 
unless there is stronger and more robust endorsement that attracts greater risk of infringing 
consumer protection provisions.  Not only does the report raise the concerns of organisations 
being subject to legal damages, but it also the damage to the trust of the public in nonprofit 
organisations.  This was in the first place one of the attractions of businesses using the power of 
the reputation and trustworthiness of nonprofit organisations and their independence.  It cannot be 
too long before such issues begin to arise in Australia as the cause related market starts to 
become crowded. 
 
Reform Agenda for fundraising 
 
1. Uniform legislation or scheme 
At the very least state's legislation needs to be uniform with the same definitions of 
organisations and activities. 
 
2. Mutual recognition of provisions 
Registration and approval in one jurisdiction should relieve the requirement for 
complete re-registration in another jurisdiction.  Duplication of multiple and different 
filing returns should be removed and replaced with an Australian Business Number 
driven central computer register. 
 
3. Clear regulatory strategy of what is required to be regulated  
Some behaviour is not unique to nonprofit organisations and is perhaps more 
efficiently and effectively regulated by general regulation that focuses on the activity 
rather than who is the actor.  For example, issues such as privacy, nuisance and 
deceptive conduct may be more appropriately regulated by agencies other than 
those responsible for charitable collections. 
 
4. Adoption of a legal compliance model of enforcement 
As indicated earlier, the legal compliance model of regulation has much to 
recommend it in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
5. Addressing the new technologies. 
The new technologies pose some difficult issues for Australian regulators with no 
clear answers evident at present.  Collections’ regulators and charitable 
organisations need to join the corporate, taxation, communication and fair trading 
regulators in seeking to grapple with the issues through national and international 
co-operation. 
 
6. Adopting new administrative systems 
Fundraising regulators need to be able to develop integrated technology systems to 
facilitate compliance and reduce their administrative costs.  Examples that have 
been mentioned previously are use of the Internet for filing returns and providing 
public registers of approved organisations and activities.  Only New South Wales 
and Western Australia have any information readily available on the Internet in 
relation to fundraising regulation. 
 
 
73 Office of the New York State Attorney General, What's in a Nonprofit's Name, April, 1999, 
http://oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/nonprofit/executive_summary.html. 
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Redeployment of Nonprofit Capital 
 
The common wisdom is that the growth of charitable giving and particularly foundations in the next 
decade will come from the transfer of wealth from the baby boomers and migrants as they start to 
die in considerable numbers.74 While this may be so, there is an even greater intra-sector transfer 
of wealth that will occur.  This is in the redeployment of charitable assets. 
 
The redeployment of Australian assets presently locked in charitable assets and funds will start to 
gain momentum in the next decade for a number of reasons.  There are redeployments that will 
come from the conversion of assets from nonprofit control to for-profit control, where the sale 
proceeds will be directed into new foundations.  Prime candidates for such conversion are the 
assets of health-related nonprofits.  Other deployments may come from charity supervision 
registries being pushed to take their role more seriously through greater accountability. 
 
In both these situations the present state of regulation and facilitation of such transactions requires 
attention in order for the redirection of nonprofit capital to be socially useful.  In England and Wales 
over the last three decades there have been successive administrative modernisations of the 
process of redirecting assets of charities that have outlived their purposes.75 In America, the 
administrative process has been hastily reformed, and in some cases, after the horse has bolted.  
Australian jurisdictions are not well served by present cy-pres arrangements and this will be an 
important issue for State Attorneys General in the next decade. 
 
Charitable trusts are the only category of trust that have perpetual succession rather than a limited 
life span.  Problems arise when a charitable trust can no longer fulfil its purposes because it does 
not have sufficient income or capital, the purpose is no longer relevant, the trust ceases to operate, 
or the trust has excess funds.  A common law doctrine of cy-pres operates as a positive duty on 
trustees to seek the guidance of the courts to redirect the funds to purposes as near as possible to 
the original intention of the donors.  This usually involves the Attorney General of the state as the 
protector of charities and the court in approving the changed purposes.  In Australia, the cy pres 
applications are notoriously expensive, delayed and not abided by in many instances. 
 
Some recent cy-pres applications do not arouse a great deal of faith in the efficient redeployment 
of dormant charitable funds.  For example, Re Application by Perpetual Trustees Queensland Ltd 
No 4239 of 1999, involved an endowment fund of $64,000 for charitable purposes.  Between 1937 
and 1950, there was not a meeting of trustees and, thereafter concerning the future of the trust, the 
judge noted, 
 
"Thereafter at various times the incumbent Lord Mayor of Brisbane, officers of the 
Justice Department, and the present applicant raised questions as to the future 
management of the trust, the desirability of passing legislation with respect to it, and 
otherwise debated among themselves the future management of the trust.  However, 
nothing concrete has ever been done."76 
 
In another recent case, Re Anzac Cottages Trust77 was a charitable fund established in 1915 to 
provide housing to war widows.  Cottages were gradually sold over the years with funds going into 
a trust fund.  The last sale of a cottage was in 1983.  Since then tin excess of $500,000 sat in an 
investment account to support the last remaining cottage which the judge described as "although 
historically and culturally significant, is a modest wooden cottage, badly in need of repair."78 The 
matter was finally dealt with in May 2000. 
 
 
74 D Leat & E Lethlean, "Trusts and Foundations in Australia", Philanthropy Monograph No. 2, Philanthropy Australia Inc., 
Melbourne, 2000, at p. 39. 
 
75 H. Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities, 3rd ed, Butterworths, London, 1999 refer Part III. 
 
76 Williams J, Re Application by Perpetual Trustees Queensland Ltd, No. 4239 of 1999, at para 15. 
 
77 [2000] QSC 175. 
 
78 Ibid at para 12. 
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In Roman Catholic Trusts Corp. for Diocese of Melbourne v Att. Gen. (Vic)79 the Roman Catholic 
Diocese as trustee of a trust applied for a cy-pres order.  A person in 1908 gave the Diocese in 
trust 90 hectares of land at Shoreham in Victoria for the establishment of a educational farm for 
orphan boys.  A farm was never constructed, but the Christian Brothers erected a dormitory on part 
of the land as a holiday site.  Even this dormitory had fallen into disrepair at the time of the 
application.  Although 92 years had passed, the parties argued that, 
 
"It was put on behalf of the Corporation that the trust was never practicable so that, 
notwithstanding the passage of so many years, this is a case of initial impracticability 
rather than a supervening impracticability."80 
 
The court ordered that the land was to be sold and the proceeds applied for the benefit of 
disadvantaged children.  In any view, over ninety years is a considerable time to reach the 
conclusion that the trust's purpose was impractical from the start. 
 
A combination of factors in the next decade will prompt the parties involved such as trustees, the 
Attorney General and Collections Act regulators to examine more closely the activities of non-
performing charities and trusts.  For example, the ROGATE registration process should identify 
many moribund charitable funds, if the ATO take their role seriously.  In addition the 
computerization of register records in many Collections Registries will assist in this regard.  
Administratively efficient mechanisms that avoid costly Supreme Court litigation that would devour 
many small funds in legal fees need to be developed to make lazy capital work again in the 
community's interests. 
 
Another example is the dissolution of nonprofit clubs and societies that have enjoyed tax 
exemption over the years and received government grants to establish their facilities.  Clubs such 
as lawn bowling clubs are being disbanded.  Some are able to alter their constitution to permit the 
remaining members on dissolution to receive any surplus funds.  This has occurred in several lawn 
bowling clubs and appears to be entirely within the law.  However, the question has to be asked, 
What benefit should the community investment in the way of taxation exemptions, rates rebates, 
concessional leases of land and government grants also receive from the surplus assets.  As our 
population's interests change even more rapidly, this will be a pressing issue. 
 
The most significant challenge for the Australian community is the possible redeployment of 
community welfare assets that are held in charitable trust or by charitable institutions.  This has 
been a growing issue in America over the last decade and shows no signs of slowing with respect 
to health organisations. 
 
In America, between 1981 and 1995, the percentage of health maintenance organisations has 
dropped from 82 % to 29%.81 Hundreds of nonprofit hospitals are being involved in mergers and 
acquisitions each year.  For example, in 1996, there were 768 hospitals involved in 235 mergers 
and acquisitions.82 Overcapacity resulting from increased competition, technological advances and 
desire to reduce dependency on federal funding and create additional sources of capital have been 
the main causal factors. 
 
Up to 1997, an estimated ninety foundations with total assets of $9.3 billion have been created 
from health care conversions with a median asset size of $57 million.83 The conversions have 
been accompanied by American State Attorneys General litigating to ensure that appropriate 
consideration is paid for such nonprofit organisations and that the assets were redirected to 
 
79 [2000] VSC 360. 
 
80 Ibid, a para 5. 
 
81 G Claxton, J Feder, D Shactman & S. Altman, "Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An Overview", Health 
Affairs, Vol. 16(2), pp 9-28 at p.12. 
 
82 R.K. Campbell, "Hospital Collaboration Laws, Anti-trust and State Action Immunity: Will these laws Pass Muster", 
Emory Law Journal, Vol 47(3), 1998, p 1003 at p 1003. 
 
83 H Meyer," A lot is Not Enough: For Foundations Spun Off by Hospital Sales, Even Billions Go Only So Far", 71 
Hospital & Health Networks, 30, 30 (1997). 
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acceptable purposes.  For example, one of California's largest HMOs offered was bought by its 
officers and managers for $108 million.  There was an outcry that the deal was at an undervalue.  
Subsequent litigation arrived at the result that the final payment was $300 million plus an 80 
percent ownership interest in the new for profit organisation.  The proceeds established the 
Wellness Foundation that has $1.2 billion in assets.84  
 
As similar factors are coming into play in Australia, the large nonprofit health players are starting to 
plan for this eventuality.  Some small nonprofit employment services have already converted from 
being nonprofit community agencies into for profit businesses, usually without considering the cy-
pres arrangements in the transfer. 
 
An example is the Sisters of Mercy Congregation in Brisbane.  In 1906, the Mater Misericordiae 
Hospital was established in a rented property in North Quay, Brisbane with six Sisters of Mercy 
and two lay staff.  In 1915 it had a total of 1934 admissions for the year with a wages bill of 318 
pounds representing an average of a penny per week per patient.  Today, it is one of the largest 
hospital complexes in Australia with over 850 beds, including a public hospital, a co-located 
regional hospital, a university research and training facility, and a total budget of over $400 million.  
The Sisters of Mercy also operate a range of schools, disability care, hostels and community 
centres.  Traditionally, sisters have traditional played a very active role in the staffing and senior 
management of the institutions and in 1974 over 500 held such positions. 
 
There are presently approximately 300 members of the congregation, with 35 under the age of 55 
years.  In 2010, there will be 3 under that age and, by 2020, there will be one and the majority will 
be over 85 years.  This poses many issues both now and in the immediate future for the 
congregation. 
 
This is typical of the issues faced by other Australian congregations in the order that have over 
$600 million in revenue from hospitals alone.  Other examples include Sisters of Charity with over 
$575 million, St John of God and Little Company of Mary.  They all are facing a health environment 
that is particularly turbulent at present with increased pressures on funding and competition.  One 
of the options seriously under consideration is the transfer of assets to another nonprofit or for 
profit organisation.  It is not only a concern for Catholic orders, as the Uniting Church in Australia 
faces declining and aging Church attenders, with 20% over 70 years and nearly one half over 60.85 
This is compounded by the younger church attenders having little interest in, commitment to or 
involvement in the social welfare activities of the Church.86 With half the beds in Australia's non-
government hospitals being nonprofit, there is much room for asset redeployment.87 
 
The literature generated by this nonprofit conversion process is now substantial and beyond the 
scope of this paper.88 In the American context, the process has raised a number of concerns such 
as: 
 
1. Inability of Attorneys General and courts to adequately protect the public interest because 
of cumbersome procedures not able to cope with large financial conversions; 
 
2. Conflicts of interest by nonprofit board members and senior managers who are also to be 
officers of the for profit corporation, where they are given financial incentives or  shares; 
 
3. Valuation of nonprofit enterprises that is appearing to be an inherently subjective process; 
 
 
84 J. H. Goddeeris & B. Weisbrod, "Conversion from Nonprofit to For-profit Legal Status: Why does it happen and Should 
anyone care?", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol 17(2), 1998, p215 at p. 216. 
 
85 P J Hughes, Religion in Australia, Christian Research Association, Adelaide, 1997, p. 68. 
 
86 R Powell, "Let Me In, Let Me Out: A Profile of Generation X Church Attenders", Uniting Church Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
March 2000, p 1. 
 
87 ABS, Private Hospitals Australia, Cat. No. 4390.0,  1998, Table 4, p. 15. 
 
88 A good summary article is JJ Fishman, "Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the 
Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organisations to For-Profit Status", Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 23 (4) 1998, p 
701. 
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4. Lack of disclosure of information concerning the conversion, conducted without meaningful  
community involvement; 
 
5. Financing the conversion through joint venturing and placing an unacceptable amount of 
risk on the nonprofit institution; 
 
6. New foundations have been controlled by for profit interests, not involving the general 
community.  There are concerns about the nature of grants being used for frivolous 
purposes or to support related for profit institutions. 
 
Another direct result in America is that the taxation benefits that health care organisations enjoy 
are being scrutinized and altered.  An increasing number of American states are requiring hospitals 
to prove that they are worthy of tax exemption.89 They are required to document how they are 
serving their community's health care needs as well as spend a minimum amount on care for the 
indigent and needy or lose their exemption.90 The other issue is an "exit tax" on nonprofit 
conversions designed to capture some of the economic benefits of tax exemption previously given 
to the converting enterprise.  An example is the City Council of Washington D.C. where a fee of 
10% of the real estate taxes for the past five years is levied on nonprofit hospital conversions.  The 
State of Virginia where the whole of the monies is to be paid to the State on conversions.91 
 
Given the aggressive adoption in Australia of the privatisation of government businesses and 
demutualisation of insurance and financial institutions, it may be that the conditions for conversion 
of nonprofit institutions to for-profits will soon be upon us.  Already, for profit American health 
corporations are assessing the Australian health market for rapid acquisition and growth.  We need 
the laws and regulation in place to ensure that the conversion assets are preserved for the benefit 
of the community as was intended by their donors over many years. 
 
 
What are the implications for the Research Agenda? 
 
Australian nonprofit research is starting to yield some useful results that can inform the public 
policy process.  It still has a long road to travel before there is an appropriate body of scholarship 
that befits its economic and social importance in contemporary Australian society.  I offer some 
suggestions. 
 
Those in the discipline of public policy need to examine why Australian governments have not 
regarded the broad nonprofit sector as a sufficiently high priority for broad policy and regulatory 
reform.  This will involve an analysis of the dynamics of recent Australian policy environment as 
well as that of Great Britain, United States and Canada. 
 
Keen insights about the nonprofit sector are required to inform appropriate policy development that 
will facilitate nonprofit organisations, their transactions and regulation.  This research begins with 
obtaining a notion of the characteristics of nonprofit organisations in Australia and how they differ 
from nonprofit organisations in other comparable societies and for-profit enterprise.  The various 
registries that require information from nonprofit organisations are a good place to start, but they 
have been less than productive to date because the information provided is not of high quality, 
much of it is missing and there is no will to collect and collate the material in a rigorous and 
meaningful way.  Computerisation of registers and the use of the single entity identifier created 
through the Australian Business Number offer the avenue to achieving more useful and timely 
information than is presently available.  The new regulation represented by the ASIC and the 
ACCC depend on good market place intelligence and a detailed knowledge of the likely behaviors 
of market players.  This understanding is not evident in most agencies dealing with nonprofit 
regulation. 
 
 
89 New York, California, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah all have such laws. 
 
90 Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care, Redefining the Community Benefit Standard: State law Approaches to ensuring 
the Social Acountabilty of Nonprofit Health Care Organisations, Washington, 1999. 
 
91 J.D. Colombo, "A Proposal for an Exit Tax on Nonprofit Conversion Transactions", The Journal of Corporation Law, 
Vol. 23(4) 1998 , p 779 at p. 797. 
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These insights are necessary not only as to the place of nonprofits in our economy and society, but 
also how they organize and operate internally.  The challenge is to break from the principal and 
agent paradigm that drives much of the for-profit policy debate in accounting, accountability and 
governance issues.  The nature of most nonprofit organisations with multiple stakeholders, rather 
than “owners” does not easily fit into a principal and agent framework.  New theories need to be 
developed taking account of this and other characteristic of nonprofit organisations.  New public 
company governance theory such as Team Production Theory and Stewardship Theory are 
possible avenues for the development of useful theories.92 Until this theory is developed, tested 
and applied, regulatory devices may not produce the intended results as they cannot be crafted to 
suit the attributes of nonprofit behaviour. 
 
One policy issue that is behind much of the incidental regulation of nonprofit organisations 
occurring in major reform areas such as taxation is that they must “compete” with other businesses 
on a level playing field.  The simple logic that nonprofit organisations have an exemption from 
some tax or regulatory requirement and therefore must have a competitive advantage in the 
market place is open to challenge.  In both America and Europe there are substantial literatures on 
whether such advantages do exist.93 In some cases, advantages do exist, but it is not so simple as 
stated and applied by policy analysts in Australia.  Further work needs to be pursued about the 
behavior of nonprofits in Australian market places. 
 
The previous point is also bound up with the issue that none of the economic or policy models 
employed to measure the effect of The New Tax System was able to predict the consequences of 
policy on the nonprofit sector.  Models need to be developed or existing models expanded to 
include the nonprofit sector.  Once again this depends on the flow of reliable data about the sector. 
 
 
92 M.M. Blair, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85 (2), March 1999, p. 247; L. 
Donaldson & JH Davis, “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns” Australian 
Journal of Management, Vol 6(1), pp 49-64. 
 
93 JJ Cordes & B. Weisbrod, "Differential Taxation of Nonprofits and the Commercialization of Nonprofit Revenues", 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 17, No.2, 1998, pp 195-214; WH Welford & JG Gallagher, Unfair 
Competition? The Challenge to Charitable Tax Exemption, The National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and 
Welfare Organizations, Washington, 1988; B. Weisbrod, To Profit or Not to Profit - The Commercial Transformation of 
the Nonprofit Sector, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998. 
